Determinism holds that free will does not exist. It simply can’t. If materialism is true, you have no other option. Your apparent ability to choose is logically bound to the outcome dictated by the laws of nature and causal chain of events that brought all of reality to this state at this moment. There just aren’t any other causal factors to consider because nothing else exists.

This position, while logically necessary, has all kinds of outlandish consequences, not the least of which being that no one is morally responsible for their actions.

Unlike some other topics where a theistic solution, given theism that is true, is obviously correct, free will is tricky business for a theist as well. Theism holds that God is omniscient, all knowing, and by direct effect knows every choice you’ll ever make. To further complicate matters, God is omnipotent, all powerful, and is sovereign over all causes and effects, ordaining the whole of history. If God’s knowledge is perfectly accurate, he knows what you’re going to choose, and is said to have ordained that outcome, how can you really be free to make that choice?

Luis de Molina, a 16th century theologian, proposed an interesting solution preserving both human free will and God’s sovereign decree over all of creation. Molina asserted that God has “middle knowledge”, essentially knowing the truth value of every possible statement, regardless of if those conditions are ever actualized in reality. On this view, God’s middle knowledge contains every free will decision you have ever made and will ever make, but it also contains what the outcome of your decisions would have been if you were born 1,000 years ago or 10,000 years ago.

With this perfect insight, God is in a position to actualize the best possible world, one that is completely subject to his divine sovereign power, while still creating creatures with true freedom of the will.

But, you object, if God perfectly knows the outcome of your decisions, they must be determined by him and thus you’re still not morally responsible for your actions and we’re no better off than materialism. This objection misses two important points: knowledge is not causally effectual and moral responsibility is bound to the origin of intent.

Of course, for varying reasons, many theists don’t subscribe to Molina’s view. Nevertheless, it’s a well considered, logically sound position that has seen a resurgence of support among theistic philosophers.